{"id":9972,"date":"2026-01-19T10:03:35","date_gmt":"2026-01-19T10:03:35","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/serisec.com\/index.php\/2026\/01\/19\/new-kerberos-relay-attack-uses-dns-cname-to-bypass-mitigations-poc-released\/"},"modified":"2026-01-19T10:03:35","modified_gmt":"2026-01-19T10:03:35","slug":"new-kerberos-relay-attack-uses-dns-cname-to-bypass-mitigations-poc-released","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/serisec.com\/index.php\/2026\/01\/19\/new-kerberos-relay-attack-uses-dns-cname-to-bypass-mitigations-poc-released\/","title":{"rendered":"New Kerberos Relay Attack Uses DNS CNAME to Bypass Mitigations \u2013 PoC Released"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>    New Kerberos Relay Attack Uses DNS CNAME to Bypass Mitigations \u2013 PoC Released<br \/>\n \t<BR><br \/>\n<BR><\/BR><br \/>\n    <!-- no image --><br \/>\n \t<BR><br \/>\n<BR><\/BR><\/p>\n<div>\n<p>A critical flaw in <a href=\"https:\/\/cybersecuritynews.com\/windows-kerberos-vulnerability\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Windows Kerberos<\/a> authentication that significantly expands the attack surface for credential relay attacks in Active Directory environments.<\/p>\n<p>By abusing how Windows clients handle DNS CNAME responses during Kerberos service ticket requests, attackers can coerce systems into requesting tickets for attacker-controlled services, bypassing traditional protections.<\/p>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogger.googleusercontent.com\/img\/b\/R29vZ2xl\/AVvXsEiQlqKxeNdnqKAAFkOlChYvyWdmRUc4euTInuFWI4JsmkeudHkwG23bYCISqoYYGmkncGlBjDnOTIZqdkkbkZG-Hmy1PO8etkFRtuBzybKbBTIiP4uNE8IFrG39SuHuNxZGj-JiF4OU805O1obsTjX0piCIgrvJJ4SUrsDp-4rBH8STWWEGSG3EAO_Yz_8\/s1600\/Screenshot%25202026-01-19%2520120030%2520%25281%2529.webp?ssl=1\" alt=\"Abuse flow chart\"><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Abuse\u00a0flow\u00a0chart (Source: Cymulate)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-the-attack-vector\"><strong>The Attack Vector<\/strong><\/h2>\n<p>The vulnerability centers on a fundamental behavior: when a Windows client receives a <a href=\"https:\/\/cybersecuritynews.com\/savvy-seahorse-hackers-dns\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">DNS CNAME record<\/a>, it follows the alias. It constructs the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) request using the CNAME hostname as the Service Principal Name (SPN).<\/p>\n<p>An attacker positioned on-path to intercept DNS traffic can exploit this to force victims into requesting service tickets for attacker-chosen targets.<\/p>\n<p>The technique requires an attacker to establish DNS <a href=\"https:\/\/cybersecuritynews.com\/yono-sbi-banking-app-vulnerability\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">man-in-the-middle<\/a> capabilities through ARP poisoning, DHCPv6 poisoning (MITM6), or similar methods.<\/p>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogger.googleusercontent.com\/img\/b\/R29vZ2xl\/AVvXsEiobI4JVpV8AqKPE-5yE2rmDFY7Zz4824WXjZYqdnxeZKNVrREg1m29x77mQs-44NaM0jVCVIbt1wdr6H1kFK3xMLcWDLahT8yFb1Wgkt-_VHlyHFJOots2XC9U2h7tVnU0njhixoJvioOZrow35WV8QwpR2yjdEUVL9I6NGWj2TArGc1qU_HdynK3Ffnk\/s1600\/Screenshot%25202026-01-19%2520115946%2520%25282%2529.webp?ssl=1\" alt=\"The victim is redirected to the attacker\u2019s server, which responds with 401 to force Kerberos authentication.\"><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">The victim is redirected to the attacker\u2019s server, which responds with 401 to force Kerberos authentication. (Source: Cymulate)<\/p>\n<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p>When a victim attempts to access a legitimate domain asset, the malicious DNS server responds with a CNAME record pointing to an attacker-controlled hostname, along with an A record resolving to the attacker\u2019s IP address.<\/p>\n<p>This causes the victim to authenticate against the attacker\u2019s infrastructure using a ticket intended for the attacker\u2019s target service.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Attack Capabilities and Impact<\/strong>:<\/p>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table is-style-stripes\">\n<table class=\"has-fixed-layout\">\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Impact Area<\/th>\n<th>Description<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>RCE<\/strong><\/td>\n<td>Remote code execution via ADCS Web Enrollment (ESC8)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>Relay Attacks<\/strong><\/td>\n<td>Cross-protocol relays (HTTP\u2192SMB, HTTP\u2192LDAP)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>Lateral Movement<\/strong><\/td>\n<td>Unauthorized access and network spread<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>Impersonation<\/strong><\/td>\n<td>User impersonation without passwords<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/figure>\n<p>Testing confirmed exploitation works on default configurations across Windows 10, <a href=\"https:\/\/cybersecuritynews.com\/windows-11-pcs-fail-to-shut-down\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Windows 11<\/a>, Windows Server 2022, and Windows Server 2025.<\/p>\n<p>The attack succeeds against unprotected services, including SMB, HTTP, and LDAP, when signing or Channel Binding Tokens (CBT) are not enforced. The vulnerability was responsibly disclosed to Microsoft in October 2025.<\/p>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogger.googleusercontent.com\/img\/b\/R29vZ2xl\/AVvXsEgNyF6OCsh2g6optm8PE4vXJ_diDBZfxgTDGu75f6hPKunHf2rIJEvlpR535q6u9vRxTnByU54SBQY-OtHfvbSlWuoB_lmMR5bOrd4g2QMIs0YzIZrrhBFdionUCxWt8h3gQw1AYKRH22_XYF2xvsVb3j7cSSD8LwoIN9k-Gl8511bnIniR_jvzqhW1Mi8\/s1600\/Screenshot%25202026-01-19%2520121833%2520%25281%2529.webp?ssl=1\" alt=\"DNS poisoning redirects the victim to a malicious target, forcing a Kerberos TGS request.\n\"><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">DNS poisoning redirects the victim to a malicious target, forcing a Kerberos TGS request. (Source: Cymulate)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p>In response, Microsoft implemented CBT support for HTTP.sys. It released patches across supported Windows Server versions in January 2026 security updates, tracked as <a href=\"https:\/\/cybersecuritynews.com\/microsoft-patch-tuesday-january-2026\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">CVE-2026-20929<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>However, this mitigation only addresses HTTP relay scenarios. The underlying DNS CNAME coercion primitive remains unchanged, leaving other protocols vulnerable.<\/p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-proof-of-concept\"><strong>Proof of Concept<\/strong><\/h2>\n<p>Researchers released a modified version of the MITM6 tool on <a href=\"https:\/\/github.com\/BenZamir\/MITM6-Kerberos-CNAME-Abuse?tab=readme-ov-file\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">GitHub<\/a> with CNAME poisoning capabilities. The tool supports targeted CNAME poisoning against specific domains or all DNS queries.<\/p>\n<p>Includes DNS-only mode for ARP poisoning integration, and enables passthrough for critical infrastructure connectivity. Exploitation requires Python 3.x and a <a href=\"https:\/\/cybersecuritynews.com\/linux-admin-tools\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Linux<\/a> operating system.<\/p>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogger.googleusercontent.com\/img\/b\/R29vZ2xl\/AVvXsEh3GVHskI8QqTyqgHLHtMeksINm4fAWd1wII4-sbZWyVUJfaeMNfy14TQqrriJI9NlM8m2QZjApZk7AfiqtM3qMLl7SrJ2ilqIKbNfWqI2dbwZUub5wX2tK3TxQA0jZgebyfRQkRjJ0bM6Kp4om0avXwMSXRLyfnyxczkEVT1o-Ifq6wUQS1woKHQWReu4\/s1600\/Screenshot%25202026-01-19%2520120808%2520%25281%2529.webp?ssl=1\" alt=\"A record for\u00a0adcs-server.mycorp.local\u00a0pointing to the attacker\u2019s IP\u00a0\"><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">A record for\u00a0adcs-server.mycorp.local\u00a0pointing to the attacker\u2019s IP\u00a0 (Source: Cymulate)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p>Cymulate Research Labs <a href=\"https:\/\/cymulate.com\/blog\/kerberos-authentication-relay-via-cname-abuse\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">advises<\/a> organizations to implement layered defenses:<\/p>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table is-style-stripes\">\n<table class=\"has-fixed-layout\">\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Security Layer<\/th>\n<th>Recommended Control<\/th>\n<th>Purpose<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>SMB Security<\/td>\n<td>Enforce SMB signing on all servers beyond domain controllers<\/td>\n<td>Prevents SMB relay and man-in-the-middle attacks<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Directory Services<\/td>\n<td>Require LDAP signing and enforce LDAPS Channel Binding Tokens (CBT) where supported<\/td>\n<td>Protects against LDAP relay and credential interception<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Web Services<\/td>\n<td>Mandate HTTPS with CBT for all internal HTTP services<\/td>\n<td>Mitigates NTLM relay attacks over HTTP<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>DNS Infrastructure<\/td>\n<td>Harden DNS servers and consider DNS over HTTPS (DoH)<\/td>\n<td>Reduces DNS spoofing and traffic manipulation risks<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Kerberos Monitoring<\/td>\n<td>Monitor anomalous TGS requests targeting unusual SPNs<\/td>\n<td>Detects potential Kerberos abuse or lateral movement<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Threat Detection<\/td>\n<td>Alert on cross-protocol authentication patterns<\/td>\n<td>Identifies NTLM\/Kerberos relay and protocol abuse attempts<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/figure>\n<p>The research underscores a critical security reality: Kerberos itself does not inherently prevent relay attacks.\u00a0 Enforcement of protection lies at the service level.<\/p>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogger.googleusercontent.com\/img\/b\/R29vZ2xl\/AVvXsEi0AklpQFqgaore4ksvtXibSw6iN16BIcwra8ONjuRibjpijM3uc0Mpl0m-6YgCBRI6GCndIzIT6L8nzLrhxFqEgOkU-6uDMOrvbTASp3rwPoutrVnyZebxwx42nZprA0dHOGiRN6OcvjoXPXHZoPJavXx6BKUkWrcc1wBeQVAMwCkuxSR9I5VQnLbuIhc\/s1600\/Screenshot%25202026-01-19%2520121551%2520%25281%2529.webp?ssl=1\" alt=\"After DNS poisoning, the victim connects to the attacker\u2019s rogue HTTP or SMB server.\"><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">After DNS poisoning, the victim connects to the attacker\u2019s rogue HTTP or SMB server.(Source: Cymulate)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p>Disabling NTLM alone is insufficient; organizations must explicitly enforce anti-relay protections across every Kerberos-enabled service to eliminate relay risk effectively.<\/p>\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-background\" style=\"background:linear-gradient(180deg,rgb(238,238,238) 94%,rgb(169,184,195) 100%)\"><strong>Follow us on <a href=\"https:\/\/news.google.com\/publications\/CAAqMggKIixDQklTR3dnTWFoY0tGV041WW1WeWMyVmpkWEpwZEhsdVpYZHpMbU52YlNnQVAB?hl=en-IN&amp;gl=IN&amp;ceid=IN:en\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">Google News<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.linkedin.com\/company\/cybersecurity-news\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">LinkedIn<\/a>, and <a href=\"https:\/\/x.com\/cyber_press_org\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">X<\/a> for daily cybersecurity updates. <a href=\"https:\/\/cybersecuritynews.com\/contact-us\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">Contact us<\/a> to feature your stories.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The post <a href=\"https:\/\/cybersecuritynews.com\/kerberos-relay-attack-uses-dns-cname\/\">New Kerberos Relay Attack Uses DNS CNAME to Bypass Mitigations \u2013 PoC Released<\/a> appeared first on <a href=\"https:\/\/cybersecuritynews.com\/\">Cyber Security News<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p> \t<BR><br \/>\n <BR><\/BR><br \/>\n    Abinaya<br \/>\n \t<BR><br \/>\n<BR><\/BR><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/cybersecuritynews.com\/kerberos-relay-attack-uses-dns-cname\/\">Go to cyber-security-news<\/a><br \/>\n \t<BR><br \/>\n <BR><\/BR><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>New Kerberos Relay Attack Uses DNS CNAME to Bypass Mitigations \u2013 PoC Released A critical flaw in Windows Kerberos authentication that significantly expands the attack surface for credential relay attacks in Active Directory environments. By abusing how Windows clients handle DNS CNAME responses during Kerberos service ticket requests, attackers can coerce systems into requesting tickets [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[129,63,648,395],"tags":[130],"class_list":["post-9972","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-cyber-security","category-cyber-security-news","category-vulnerability-news","category-windows","tag-cyber-security-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/serisec.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9972"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/serisec.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/serisec.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/serisec.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/serisec.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=9972"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/serisec.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9972\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/serisec.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=9972"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/serisec.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=9972"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/serisec.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=9972"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}