{"id":13802,"date":"2026-06-23T10:03:42","date_gmt":"2026-06-23T10:03:42","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/serisec.com\/index.php\/2026\/06\/23\/researcher-earns-148337-for-google-cloud-production-rce-vulnerability\/"},"modified":"2026-06-23T10:03:42","modified_gmt":"2026-06-23T10:03:42","slug":"researcher-earns-148337-for-google-cloud-production-rce-vulnerability","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/serisec.com\/index.php\/2026\/06\/23\/researcher-earns-148337-for-google-cloud-production-rce-vulnerability\/","title":{"rendered":"Researcher Earns $148,337 for Google Cloud Production RCE Vulnerability"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>    Researcher Earns $148,337 for Google Cloud Production RCE Vulnerability<br \/>\n \t<BR><br \/>\n<BR><\/BR><br \/>\n    <!-- no image --><br \/>\n \t<BR><br \/>\n<BR><\/BR><\/p>\n<div>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A researcher has earned a total of 148,337 USD from Google for uncovering a set of flaws in Google Cloud\u2019s Application Integration service that escalated into <a href=\"https:\/\/cybersecuritynews.com\/gcp-rce-flaw\/\" id=\"https:\/\/cybersecuritynews.com\/gcp-rce-flaw\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">remote code execution (RCE) in Google Cloud<\/a> production.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The core bug is now tracked as CVE\u20112026\u20112031. The researcher Arvin Shivram has publicly documented the issue under the title \u201cStubZero: $148,337 RCE in Google Cloud Production\u201d on BruteCat\u2019s blog.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">CVE-2026-2031 as a critical access control flaw in Google Cloud Application Integration that can enable remote code execution, carrying a CVSS score of 10.0.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Google has addressed the issue by restricting internal endpoint access, fixing<a href=\"https:\/\/cybersecuritynews.com\/secsuite-ai-powered-tool\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\"> IDOR weaknesses<\/a>, and strengthening RPC security controls.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">According to Arvin Shivram\u2019s own write\u2011up on BruteCat.com, the chain began when an automated fuzzing tool flagged the internal API cloudcrmipfrontend-pa.googleapis.com for returning HTTP 200 responses on suspicious debugging endpoints.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Further probing revealed an endpoint, v1\/integrationPlatform\/getProtoDefinition, that would return protobuf descriptors for arbitrary internal messages and services, including YouTube and Google\u2019s internal CRM stack.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Because Google\u2019s internal services are heavily protobuf\u2011driven, this \u201creq2proto as a service\u201d style leak gave the attacker a near\u2011complete view of internal API schemas, making <a href=\"https:\/\/cybersecuritynews.com\/apex-ai-penetration-testing-agent\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">black\u2011box research<\/a> far easier.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The same API surface also exposed a listQuotaQueue endpoint, which, when queried with the right parameters and X-Goog-Encode-Response-If-Executable: base64, leaked an internal workflow execution queue along with a crucial clientId value (default).<\/p>\n<h2 id=\"h-google-cloud-production-rce-vulnerability\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Google Cloud Production RCE Vulnerability<\/strong><\/h2>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Armed with the leaked client ID, the researcher could create draft workflows via createDraftWorkflow in the internal Application Integration backend and began exploring tasks visible in the discovery document.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The turning point came with an internal task type called GenericStubbyTypedTaskV2, which the BruteCat article identifies as a generic wrapper around Google\u2019s Stubby RPC framework inside Application Integration workflows.<\/p>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-embed is-type-video is-provider-youtube wp-block-embed-youtube wp-embed-aspect-16-9 wp-has-aspect-ratio\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-embed__wrapper\">\n<iframe loading=\"lazy\" title=\"RCE in Google Cloud ($148k bounty)\" width=\"696\" height=\"392\" src=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/QO0lx-PQAL0?feature=oembed\" frameborder=\"0\" allow=\"accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share\" referrerpolicy=\"strict-origin-when-cross-origin\" allowfullscreen><\/iframe>\n<\/div>\n<\/figure>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">By configuring GenericStubbyTypedTaskV2 with parameters such as serverSpec, serviceName, and serviceMethod, the attacker could trigger arbitrary Stubby RPC calls from Google\u2019s production environment, using the privileged service identity of the integration platform.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Google\u2019s Cloud Vulnerability Reward Program documentation classifies Stubby\u2011level access as RCE in the production environment because it provides broad access to internal services and data, depending on the RpcSecurityPolicy of the target.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Initially, workflow publishing was blocked by a two\u2011person approval requirement that prevented a single account from both editing and publishing a workflow.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <a href=\"https:\/\/brutecat.com\/articles\/google-cloud-rce\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">researcher explains on BruteCat.com<\/a> that they bypassed this restriction by abusing an internal ACL endpoint, integrationPlatform\/auth\/setAcl, to add two attacker\u2011controlled Google accounts to the workflow ACL, using one as the requester and the other as approver.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In a subsequent collaboration with another researcher (\u201cshrugged\u201d), they discovered that Google\u2019s initial mitigations were only partially deployed across backend instances behind a load balancer.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">By repeatedly sending createDraftWorkflow requests until they hit a still\u2011vulnerable backend, they preserved the RCE path just before the fix fully propagated, a detail highlighted both in the BruteCat write\u2011up and in later podcast discussions (Critical Thinking \u2013 Episode 177).<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Three months later, the same researcher identified a second RCE chain in the public Application Integration APIs involving insecure direct object references (IDOR) and the \u201ctest cases\u201d feature.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The BruteCat post details how a global test case listing RPC, combined with a binary\u2011search filter technique, allowed reconstruction of victim <a href=\"https:\/\/cybersecuritynews.com\/malicious-go-packages-as-googles-uuid-library\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">integration UUIDs <\/a>and cross\u2011tenant access to full workflow definitions, including those operated by internal Google teams.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Google\u2019s Cloud VRP rules, as published on the official program page, describe tiered payouts for \u201cCompromise of Google Cloud Production Environment,\u201d with higher tiers for privileged production users and admin\u2011level access.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In line with this, Google awarded 60,000 USD for the first chain, 75,000 USD for the second, and an additional 13,337 USD for a lingering single\u2011service privilege escalation, for a combined payout of 148,337 USD.<\/p>\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-background wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"background:linear-gradient(180deg,rgb(238,238,238) 91%,rgb(169,184,195) 100%)\"><strong>Follow us on\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/news.google.com\/publications\/CAAqMggKIixDQklTR3dnTWFoY0tGV041WW1WeWMyVmpkWEpwZEhsdVpYZHpMbU52YlNnQVAB?hl=en-IN&amp;gl=IN&amp;ceid=IN:en\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Google News<\/a>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.linkedin.com\/company\/cyber-news-live-\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">LinkedIn<\/a>,\u00a0and\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/x.com\/cyber_press_org\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">X<\/a>\u00a0to Get More Instant Updates.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The post <a href=\"https:\/\/cybersecuritynews.com\/google-cloud-production-rce-vulnerability\/\">Researcher Earns $148,337 for Google Cloud Production RCE Vulnerability<\/a> appeared first on <a href=\"https:\/\/cybersecuritynews.com\/\">Cyber Security News<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p> \t<BR><br \/>\n <BR><\/BR><br \/>\n    Abinaya<br \/>\n \t<BR><br \/>\n<BR><\/BR><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/cybersecuritynews.com\/google-cloud-production-rce-vulnerability\/\">Go to cyber-security-news<\/a><br \/>\n \t<BR><br \/>\n <BR><\/BR><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Researcher Earns $148,337 for Google Cloud Production RCE Vulnerability A researcher has earned a total of 148,337 USD from Google for uncovering a set of flaws in Google Cloud\u2019s Application Integration service that escalated into remote code execution (RCE) in Google Cloud production. The core bug is now tracked as CVE\u20112026\u20112031. The researcher Arvin Shivram [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[129,63,163,648],"tags":[130],"class_list":["post-13802","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-cyber-security","category-cyber-security-news","category-google","category-vulnerability-news","tag-cyber-security-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/serisec.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13802"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/serisec.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/serisec.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/serisec.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/serisec.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=13802"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/serisec.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13802\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/serisec.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=13802"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/serisec.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=13802"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/serisec.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=13802"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}